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Abstract 
We provide a direct test of the role of social preferences and beliefs in voluntary cooperation 
and its decline. We elicit individuals’ cooperation preference in one experiment and use them 
– as well as subjects’ elicited beliefs – to make predictions about contributions to a public 
good  played  repeatedly.  We  find  substantial  heterogeneity  in  people’s  preferences.  With 
simulation methods based on this data, we show that the decline of cooperation is driven by 
the fact that most people have a preference to contribute less than others. Belief formation and 
virtual learning do not contribute to the decline of cooperation. Universal free riding is very 
likely despite the fact that most people are not selfish. 
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Numerous public goods experiments have shown that many people contribute more to the 
public  good  than  pure  self-interest  can  easily  explain.  However,  an  equally  important 
observation  is  that  free  riding  becomes  paramount  in  repeatedly  played  public  good 
experiments across various parameters (Ledyard (1995)) and also cross-culturally (Herrmann, 
Thöni and Gächter (2008)). The facts are clear, but their explanation is not. In this paper, we 
investigate the role of social preferences and beliefs for the decline of voluntary cooperation.  
In the previous literature an obvious candidate for explaining the decay of cooperation 
was  learning  the  free  rider  strategy.  Andreoni  (1988)  showed,  however,  that  cooperation 
resumed after a restart, which is inconsistent with a pure learning argument. Several papers 
since  investigate  the  role  of  confusion  and  argue  that  contributions  that  are  not  due  to 
confusion might possibly be explained by social preferences (e.g., Andreoni (1995); Palfrey 
and Prisbrey (1997); Kurzban and Houser (2005); Ferraro and Vossler (2005)). The typical 
approach  of  these  experiments  is  indirect  in  the  following  sense:  a  standard  public  good 
experiment is compared to a setup in which social motives for contributing are removed. Any 
resulting  cooperation  in  the  latter  treatment  is  due  to  confusion.  The  difference  of 
contributions in the main experiment and “confused contributions” can then be possibly due 
to social preferences.
1  
A further indirect approach to identify the role of social preferences for the decline of 
cooperation is to allow subjects to revise their decisions repeatedly and to study whether the 
revisions  depend  on  the  contributions  of  the  other  players  (Kurzban  and  Houser  (2001); 
Levati and Neugebauer (2004)). Such a correlation is then interpreted as evidence for social 
preferences. This method has the disadvantage that there are strategic incentives and repeated 
game  effects,  which  make  the  interpretation  of  correlations  between  other  subjects’ 
                                                 
1 Palfrey and Prisbrey (1997) is an exception. They design an experiment that allows them estimating warm 
glow, altruism and errors directly. They find significant warm-glow effects and that the decay of contributions is 
largely due to reduced errors.     2
contribution  and  the  revisions  ambiguous.  Finally,  also  experiments  on  “assortative 
regrouping” of subjects provide indirect evidence for conditional cooperation and the reasons 
for  the  decline  of  cooperation:  In  these  experiments  (e.g.,  Burlando  and  Guala  (2005); 
Gächter and Thöni (2005); Page, Putterman and Unel (2005); Gunnthorsdottir, Houser and 
McCabe (2007)), contributors are matched up with contributors, and free riders with free 
riders. The results show that contributions are largely stabilized if free riders are moved out of 
the group. This suggests that cooperators are only conditionally cooperative and therefore 
preference heterogeneity plays an important role for explaining the decay of cooperation in 
randomly composed groups. 
Our approach is a direct one because we measure people’s cooperation preferences in a 
specially-designed  public  good  game  (called  the  “P-experiment”)  and  observe  the  same 
people in a sequence of ten one-shot games (labeled the “C-experiment”), in which we also 
elicit people’s beliefs about others’ contributions. Such an approach is promising in our view 
because the fact that most people free ride eventually is a prima facie challenge to social 
preference  explanations  of  people’s  cooperative  behavior  (see,  e.g.,  Binmore  (2006)). 
Moreover, our direct approach allows us to quantify how preference heterogeneity and beliefs 
interact in voluntary cooperation.  
Our data from the P-experiment show that people differ strongly in their contribution 
preferences. This is consistent with previous evidence. The biggest groups of people are (i) 
conditional cooperators who cooperate if others cooperate,  and  (ii)  free  riders  who  never 
contribute  anything,  irrespective  how  much  others  contribute.  We  push  beyond  this 
observation  of  preference  heterogeneity  by  investigating  how  measured  preferences  and 
beliefs  are  related  to  observed  contribution  behavior.  We  have  therefore  designed  our 
experiments  such  that  we  can  use  the  P-experiment  to  make  a  point  prediction  for  each 
subject about his or her contribution in the C-experiment, given his or her beliefs.    3
Our conceptual separation of beliefs and preferences allows us to answer the following 
specific  questions:  First,  do  elicited  preferences  have  any  predictive  power  in  explaining 
actual contributions? What is the role of beliefs about others’ contributions for determining 
contributions? Second, how do people form their beliefs? Third, to what extent is the decay of 
cooperation determined by preference heterogeneity? The intuitive argument – suggested first 
by  Andreoni  (1995)  who  interpreted  the  decline  in  cooperation  “to  be  due  to  frustrated 
attempts  at  kindness,  rather  than  learning  the  free-riding  incentives”  (p.  900)  –  is  that 
contributions decay because the conditional cooperators feel duped by the free riders and 
withdraw  their  contributions.  Yet,  previous  studies  (e.g.,  Croson  (2007))  showed  that 
contributions are also highly significantly correlated with beliefs. Thus, contributions might 
also decline because people lower their beliefs independently of others’ contributions. This is 
not implausible, given evidence from other games (e.g., Weber (2003)) that even “virtual 
learning”, that is, thinking repeatedly about the dominant strategy in our case, might make 
people more pessimistic about others’ contributions.    
Our  results,  which  we  detail  in  Section  II,  answer  these  questions  as  follows:  First, 
contributions are significantly positively influenced by predicted contributions, that is, the 
elicited  preferences.  In  addition  to  their  preferences  people’s  contributions  also  depend 
directly on their beliefs about others’ contributions. Second, belief formation can be described 
as a partial adjustment of one’s belief into the direction of the observed contribution of others 
in the previous period. There are no period effects on top of this process. As we will show, 
this  implies  that  beliefs  decline  only  if  contributions  decline,  but  not  vice  versa;  “virtual 
learning” is unimportant in our data. Third, contributions decline because on average people 
are  “imperfect  conditional  cooperators”  who  only  partly  match  others’  contributions.  The 
presence  of  free  rider  types  is  not  necessary  for  this  result;  contributions  also  decline  if 
everyone  is  an  imperfect  conditional  cooperator.  However,  we  show  that  preference 
heterogeneity  (that  is,  the  type-composition  of  a  group)  influences  the  speed  of  the   4
cooperative  decay.  In  the  final part  of  our  results  section  we  use  simulation  methods  to 
understand the role of belief formation, preference heterogeneity and group composition for 
the decline of cooperation. Section III concludes.  
 
I. Design and procedures 
Our basic decision situation is a standard linear public good game. The subjects are randomly 
assigned to groups of four people. Each participant is endowed with 20 tokens, which he or 
she can either keep or contribute to a "project", the public good. The payoff function is given 
as  
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where  the  public  good  is  equal  to  the  sum  of  the  contributions  of  all  group  members. 
Contributing a token to the public good yields a private marginal return of 0.4 and the social 
marginal  benefit  is  1.6.  Standard  assumptions  therefore  predict  that  all  subjects  free  ride 
completely, that is, gj = 0 for all j. This leads to a socially inefficient outcome.  
The instructions (see Appendix) explained the public good problem to the participants. 
Since we want to measure subjects’ preferences as accurately as possible, we also took great 
care to ensure that the participants understood both the rules of the game and the incentives. 
Therefore,  after  participants  had  read  the  instructions,  they  had  to  answer  ten  control 
questions. The questions tested their understanding of the comparative statics properties of 
(1), to ensure that participants are aware of their selfish incentives and the dilemma situation. 
We did not proceed until all participants had answered all questions correctly. We can thus 
safely assume that the participants understood the game. 
Within  this  basic  setup  we  conducted  two  types  of  experiments.  The  first  type  of 
experiment (the "P-experiment") elicits people’s contribution preferences in a public goods 
game. In the second type of experiment participants make contribution choices in a standard   5
linear public goods environment (labeled "C-experiment"). The C-experiment consists of ten 
rounds in the random matching mode. We chose a random matching protocol to minimize 
strategic  effects  from  repeated  play.  All  participants  play  both  types  of  experiments.  For 
example,  participants  first  go  through  the  preference  elicitation  experiment  in  the  P-C 
sessions  before  making  their  contribution  choices  in  the  C-experiment.  Our  C-P  sessions 
counterbalance the order of experiments to control for possible sequence effects. The C-P 
sequence  allows  for  a  particularly  strong  test  of  measured  preferences  because  people 
experience ten rounds of decisions in the C-experiment before their cooperation preferences 
are elicited in the P-experiment. 
The rationale of the P-experiment is to elicit people’s cooperation preferences in the sense 
of eliciting their stated willingness for cooperation: To what degree are people willing to give 
up their free rider benefit, that is, to what extent are they prepared to cooperate given other 
peoples’ degrees of cooperation? Being able to observe contribution preferences as a function 
of  other  group  members’  contribution  without  using  deception  requires  observing 
contributions that can be contingent on others’ contributions. Fischbacher, Gächter and Fehr 
(2001)  (henceforth  FGF)  introduced  an  experimental  design  that  accomplishes  this  task.
2 
Since we use exactly the same method as FGF we refer the reader to FGF for all details.  
The  central  idea  of  the  P-experiment  is  to  apply  a  variant  of  the  so-called  “strategy 
method” (Selten (1967)). The subjects’ main task in the experiment is to indicate – in an 
incentive compatible way – how much they want to contribute to the public good for each 
rounded  average  contribution  level  of  other  group  members.  Specifically,  subjects  were 
shown a “contribution table” of the 21 possible values of the average contribution of the other 
group members (from 0 to 20) and were asked to state their corresponding contribution for 
each of the 21 possibilities. Since the FGF method elicits the contribution schedules in an 
                                                 
2 Ockenfels (1999) developed a similar design independently of FGF.    6
incentive compatible way, free rider types have an incentive to enter a zero contribution for 
each of the 21 possible average contributions of other group members. Entering a positive 
contribution signals a “willingness to pay” for cooperation by foregoing the free rider benefit.  
We interpret this willingness to pay as a subject’s cooperation preference.
3   
The experiment was only played once, and the participants knew this. The rationale is that 
we wanted to elicit subjects’ preferences, without intermingling preferences with strategic 
considerations.  
Participants in the P-C sessions (C-P sessions) were only informed after finishing the P-
experiment (C-experiment) that they would play another experiment. When we explained the 
C-experiment we emphasized that the groups of four would be randomly reshuffled in each 
period.
4 After each period, subjects were informed about the sum of contributions in their 
group in that period. In addition to their contribution decisions, subjects also had to indicate 
their beliefs about the average contribution of the other three group members in the current 
period. In addition to their earnings from the public good experiment, we also paid subjects 
based on the accuracy of their estimates.
5  
                                                 
3 Our approach does not require eliciting a utility function since we do not need a complete preference order for 
our purposes. It is sufficient to know subjects’ best replies conditional on others’ contributions. 
4 The likelihood in period 1 that a player meets another player again once during the remaining nine periods was 
72 percent. The likelihood that the same group of four players meets was 2.58 percent. However, since the 
experiment was conducted anonymously, subjects were unable to recognize whether they were matched with a 
particular player in the past.  
5 Subjects had a financial incentive for correct beliefs, but it was small to avoid hedging: If their estimation was 
exactly right, subjects received 3 experimental money units (  $0.8) in addition to their other experimental 
earnings. They received 2 (1) additional money units if their estimation deviated by 1 (2) point(s) from the other 
group members' actual average contribution, and no additional money if their estimation was off the actual 
contribution by more than three points.   7
We elicited beliefs for two reasons. First, we can assess the correlation between beliefs 
and contributions, which we expect to differ between types of players. Second, by evaluating 
an elicited schedule at the elicited belief in a given period we can make a point prediction 
about  an  individual’s  contributions  in  the  C-experiment:  if  a  subject  in  the  P-experiment 
indicates in his or her schedule that he or she will contribute y tokens if the others contribute x 
tokens on average, then the prediction for this subject in the C-experiment is to contribute y 
tokens if he or she believes that others contribute x tokens on average.   
The sequence of experiments was reversed in the C-P sessions. The comparison of results 
from the P-experiments in the C-P sequence with those of the P-C sequence allow us to assess 
the relevance of experience with the public goods game for elicited cooperation preferences.  
All experiments were computerized, using the software z-Tree (Fischbacher (2007)). The 
experiments were conducted in the computer lab of the University of Zurich. Our participants 
were  undergraduates  from  various  disciplines  (except  economics)  from  the  University  of 
Zurich and the Swiss Federal Institute of Technology (ETH) in Zurich. We conducted six 
sessions (three in the P-C sequence and three in the C-P sequence). In five sessions we each 
had 24 subjects and in one 20 subjects. A post-experimental questionnaire confirmed that 
participants were largely unacquainted with one another. Our 140 subjects were randomly 
allocated  to  the  cubicles  in  each  session,  where  they  took  their  decisions  in  complete 
anonymity from the other subjects. On average, subjects earned 35 Swiss Francs (roughly 
$30, including a show-up fee of 10 Swiss Francs).
6 Each session lasted roughly 90 minutes.  
 
                                                 
6 During the experiment subjects earned their payoffs in “points” (according to (1) and the earnings from correct 
belief estimates). At the end of the experiment, we exchanged the accumulated sum of points at an exchange rate 
of 1 point = CHF 0.35 for the points earned in the P-experiment and at a rate of 1 point = CHF 0.07 for the 
points earned in the C-experiment.    8
II. Results 
We organize the discussion of our results as follows: In section A, we document the decline 
of cooperation. In section B, we present the extent of heterogeneity in people’s cooperation 
preferences and actual contribution patterns. In the remainder of this section, we analyze 
behavior in the C-experiment. We show how subjects form their beliefs (section C) and how 
their contribution decisions are related to the elicited preferences in the P-experiment (section 
D). We conclude in section E with a simulation study in which we assess how the belief 
process and subjects’ preferences affect the decline of cooperation.  
  
A. The Decline of Cooperation 
Figure 1 sets the stage for our analysis, which aims to explain the decline of cooperation. 
The figure shows the temporal patterns of cooperation and beliefs for each of our six sessions 
separately.  Figure  1  conveys  four  unambiguous  messages.  First,  contributions  and  beliefs 
decline in six out of six sessions.
7 Second, behavior in the six sessions is very similar. Third, 
contributions are lower than beliefs in almost all instances. Finally, mean period contributions 
and beliefs are highly significantly positively correlated in all six sessions (Spearman rank 
correlation tests, p<0.007). This evidence is consistent with previous findings in public goods 
games (e.g., Weimann (1994); Croson (2007); Neugebauer, Perote, Schmidt and Loos (in 
print)). 
                                                 
7 This  finding  is  consistent  with  evidence  from  previous  experiments  in  the  random  matching  mode  (e.g., 
Andreoni  (1988);  Weimann  (1994); Croson  (1996),  Croson  (2007);  Burlando  and  Hey  (1997);  Sonnemans, 



















































































































































































































































FIGURE 1. MEAN BELIEFS AND CONTRIBUTIONS OVER TIME.   
 
In the remainder of the paper we will analyze the decline of cooperation as a result of 
people’s  beliefs  as  formed  in  the  C-experiment  and  preferences  as  elicited  in  the  P-
experiment. The next step in our analysis is to look at people’s cooperation preferences and to 
investigate the extent of heterogeneity in people’s contribution behavior as a function of their 
beliefs in the C-experiment.   
 
B. Heterogeneous Preferences and Contributions 
Recall that we have a complete contribution schedule from each subject that indicates how 
much he or she is prepared to contribute as a function of others’ contribution. A simple way 
of characterizing heterogeneity is to look at the slope (of a linear regression) of the schedule 
and the mean contribution in the schedule. For instance, a free rider’s schedule consists of 
zero contributions for all contribution levels of other group members. Therefore, his slope and 
mean contribution are zero. An unconditional cooperator, who contributes 20 tokens for all 
others’ contribution levels, has a mean contribution of 20 and a slope of zero. A perfect 
conditional cooperator, who contributes exactly the amount others contribute, has a slope of   10
one and a mean contribution of 10 tokens. Figure 2A depicts the results separately for the C-P 
and the P-C experiments. The x-axis shows the slope of the schedules and the y-axis the 
average  contribution  in  the  schedule.  The  dots  in  Figure  2A  correspond  to  individual 
observations, and the size of a dot to the number of observations it represents.  
Figure 2A shows two things. First, there is a large degree of heterogeneity.
8 Free riders 
(located at 0-0) and perfect conditional cooperators (at 1-10) are relatively the largest group of 
subjects. We also find a few subjects who contribute an unconditional positive amount (along 
the y-axis, at x=0). A large number of subjects has a positive mean contribution and a positive 
slope; a few subjects have a negatively-sloped schedule (that is, they contribute more the less 
others contribute). Second, the distribution between the C-P and the P-C sessions is very 
similar. Mann-Whitney tests do not allow rejecting the null hypotheses that both means and 
slopes  are  equally  distributed  between  the  treatments  (p>0.87).
9  Thus,  elicitation  of 
preferences before subjects actually experienced contributions to the public good (in the P-C 
sessions)  or  after  (in the  C-P  sessions)  did not affect  the  elicited preferences.  This is  an 
important finding for our interpretation that the P-experiment elicits cooperation preferences. 
It shows that subjects in the C-P sessions who have experienced actual contribution behavior 
do not express different cooperation preferences than do subjects in the P-C sessions who are 
inexperienced in actual game playing when they express their preferences.
10 
                                                 
8 This evidence is consistent with other studies using different methods. See, e.g., Bardsley and Moffatt (2007), 
Kurzban  and  Houser  (2005),  Burlando  and  Guala  (2005),  Muller,  Sefton,  Steinberg  and  Vesterlund 
(forthcoming), and Herrmann and Thöni (forthcoming). 
9 In Figure 2 we looked at slope and mean contribution of a subject’s schedule. However, qualitatively, we get 
very similar results if we look at Spearman rank order correlation coefficients, linear correlation coefficients, and 
slopes and intercepts of linear regressions. In all cases p-values of Mann-Whitney tests that compare the C-P and 
the P-C experiments yield p>0.275.  
10 The  elicited  contribution  schedules  in  our  study  are  also  not  significantly  different  from  FGF  ( 2-test, 
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FIGURE 2. HETEROGENEOUS CONTRIBUTION PREFERENCES (PANEL A) AND  
ACTUAL CONTRIBUTIONS AS A FUNCTION OF BELIEFS (PANEL B). 
 
Figure 2B shows a scatter plot of individual slopes of linear regressions of contributions 
on beliefs on the x-axis and average contributions in the C-experiment on the y-axis. The dot 
size corresponds to the number of observations. Thus, the construction of Figure 2B is similar 
to Figure 2A. As in Figure 2A, we distinguish between the C-P and the P-C sessions. We find 
no sequence effect, neither with respect to average contributions nor with respect to slopes 
(Mann-Whitney tests, p > 0.21).  
Figure 2B reveals considerable heterogeneity in contribution behavior. Individual average 
contributions  (depicted  on  the  y-axis)  vary  between  0  and  20,  although  most  subjects 
contribute less than ten tokens on average. Fourteen percent of all subjects contribute exactly 
zero in all ten periods. We find that the individual estimated slopes of the schedules from the 
P-experiment (Figure 2A) and the slopes of individual linear contribution-belief regressions in 
the  C-experiments  (Figure  2B)  are  highly  significantly  positively  correlated  (Spearman’s 
 =0.39, p=0.0000). Average cooperation levels in the P-experiment and in the C-experiment 
are highly correlated as well (Spearman’s  =0.40, p=0.0000). We interpret this as a first piece 
of  evidence  that  expressed  cooperation  preferences  and  actual  cooperation  behavior  are   12
correlated at the individual level. Before we investigate the link between beliefs, preferences, 
and contributions, we look at how people form beliefs in the C-experiment.  
 
C. The Formation of Beliefs 
We investigate the question how people form their beliefs about their group members’ 
contribution  in  a  given  period  with  the  help  of  six  econometric  models.  The  estimation 
method is OLS with robust standard errors clustered on sessions as the independent units of 
observation.
11  
Model 1, which only includes “Period”, simply confirms the impression from Figure 1 
that beliefs decline significantly over time. However, this model cannot explain why there is a 
downward trend. It is natural to assume that subjects base their belief on the other players’ 
past contributions. Models 2 and 3 explain beliefs in a given period as a function of their co-
players’  contributions  in  the  past  three  periods.  We  find  that  beliefs  depend  highly 
significantly on the others’ contribution in the previous three periods. This fact can explain 
much of the decline of beliefs because the absolute value of the coefficient of the period 
variable  is  reduced  from  0.753  in  Model  1  to  0.243  in  Model  3.  A  further  interesting 
observation is that the weight of a past contribution is roughly halved from period to period.
12  
Models 2 and 3 suggest that people have a long memory when they form their beliefs. 
Yet, this may not be very plausible psychologically. It is more likely that subjects have access 
to their own previous beliefs, which they update after new information arrives. To see this, 
take periods 1 and 2. In period 1 a subject can only rely on his or her intuitive (“home-
                                                 
11 We estimated all models with random and fixed effects specifications, as well as with Tobit, with very similar 
results. For instance, the correlation coefficient of predicted values of the Tobit estimation and the OLS is 
0.9995. Since the estimation results are very similar, we only report the OLS results for ease of interpretation.  
12 This is also true if we include contribution(t-4). We did not include more lags because our experiment only ran 
for ten periods.    13
grown”) belief about others’ contributions. In period 2, he or she has also an observation 
about others’ actual contribution in period 1. A subject may therefore update his or her period 
2 belief on the basis of his or her period 1 belief and the observed period 1 contributions by 
others. A similar logic might hold in all remaining periods.  
 
TABLE 1—FORMING BELIEFS.  
  Dependent variable: Belief about other group members’ contribution 
Model  1  2  3  4  5  6 
Period  -0.753    -0.243      -0.079 
  (0.061)***    (0.077)**      (0.042) 
Others' contrib. (t-1)    0.476  0.441  0.439  0.415  0.394 
    (0.031)***  (0.034)***  (0.023)***  (0.020)***  (0.023)*** 
Others' contrib. (t-2)    0.228  0.190  -0.054     
    (0.035)***  (0.034)***  (0.042)     
Others' contrib. (t-3)    0.125  0.084  -0.026     
    (0.023)***  (0.030)**  (0.035)     
Belief (t-1)         0.592  0.569  0.549 
        (0.063)***  (0.036)***  (0.037)*** 
Constant  10.651  1.373  3.649  0.219  0.118  0.835 
   (0.661)***  (0.327)***  (0.909)**  (0.130)  (0.148)  (0.398)* 
Observations  1400  980  980  980  1260  1260 
R-squared  0.28  0.37  0.38  0.62  0.64  0.64 
OLS regressions. Robust standard errors (clustered on sessions) in parentheses. 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
 
We account for this argument in Models 4 to 6 where we include the belief a subject held 
in the previous period as an explanatory variable (“Belief (t-1)”). We find in Model 4 that 
both “Belief (t-1)” and “Others' contribution (t-1)” are highly significantly positive; more 
distant  contributions  become  small  and  insignificant.  We  omit  the  insignificant  lagged 
variables in Model 5 to gain more observations. Model 6 includes the period variable. The 
results of Models 5 and 6 are very similar to Model 4. Moreover, the sum of coefficients of 
“Belief (t-1)” and “Others' contribution (t-1)” is insignificantly different from 1 in Models 4 
to 6 (F-tests, p>0.118). We also estimated Model 6 separately for periods 1 to 5 and periods 6 
to 10. The estimated coefficients are very similar in both halves of the experiment (Chow-test,   14
p>0.1).
13 Given these results, we can summarize the belief formation process as follows: a 
subject’s belief in a given period is a weighted average of what he or she believed about 
others in the previous period and his or her observation of the others’ contribution in the 
previous period. 
The results from these regressions show that the process of belief formation is not itself 
responsible for the decline in cooperation. To isolate the process of belief formation from 
declining  cooperation,  suppose  all  subjects  are  perfect  conditional  cooperators  whose 
contributions match their beliefs about others’ average contribution perfectly.  In this case 
contributions decline only if beliefs decline per se, that is, if the belief formation process is 
inherently  pessimistic  about  others’  contribution.
14 To  see  this,  notice  that  for  perfect 
conditional  cooperators  the  average  contribution  is  equal  to  their  average  belief  and  the 
average contribution trivially equals average others’ contribution. If, furthermore, the players 
form  their  belief  according  to  Model  5,  the average  belief  equals  AvBelief(t)=  (0.569  + 
0.415)* AvBelief(t-1) + 0.118. The sum of the two coefficients (0.569 and 0.415) equals 
0.984, which is insignificantly different from 1 (F-test, p=0.549). This observation implies 
that beliefs would remain constant (or increase by 0.118 points per period). If we take the 
coefficient of 0.984 literally, the belief formation process per se can account for a decline of 
                                                 
13 We also applied an Arellano-Bond linear, dynamic panel-data estimation method (Arellano and Bond (1991)). 
However, there is still significant second order correlation (p<0.05, Arellano-Bond test) in the residuals implying 
that its estimates are inconsistent (Arellano and Bond (1991), pp. 281-282). Moreover, in simulations similar to 
those which we discuss in Section II.E it turned out that the Arellano-Bond estimates cannot explain the data 
patterns at all, whereas Models 5 and 6 can.  
14 “Virtual learning” (Weber (2003)), that is learning with no feedback by just thinking about the problem for 
several periods is a possible reason for this “pessimism”.   15
cooperation of at most 14 percent (i.e., 1-(1-0.984)
9=0.135) over the nine remaining periods 
after period 1. Thus, beliefs decline because contributions decline and not vice versa.
15 
 
D. Explaining contributions 
In this section we investigate determinants of people’s contributions econometrically. We 
have  three  explanatory  variables  –  “Period”,  “Predicted  Contribution”,  and  “Belief”.  We 
estimated five models which we document in Table 2. Some models differ according to the 
number of periods that is used in the estimations. The estimation method is OLS with robust 
standard errors clustered on sessions as the independent units of observation.
16 
Each of the first three models includes only one of our explanatory variables. Model 1, 
which  only  includes  “Period”,  confirms  the  impression  from  Figure  1  that  contributions 
decline significantly over time. Model 2 only includes the variable “Predicted contribution”, 
which is the contribution according to the elicited schedule in the P-experiment evaluated at 
the subject’s belief in a given period. If subjects’ preferences would explain contributions 
perfectly, then the slope of “Predicted contribution” would be unity and the constant would 
equal  zero.  The  results  of  Model  2  show  that  this  is  not  the  case.  Though  “Predicted 
contribution” is highly significantly positive its coefficient is less than unity; the constant is 
also positive and significant. The conclusion is that contributions are significantly influenced 
by subjects’ preferences as elicited in the P-experiment. Preferences alone cannot account for 
all contributions, however.  
                                                 
15 Neugebauer,  et  al.  (in  print)  report  experimental  results  that  are  consistent  with  this  prediction.  In  one 
treatment subjects were informed about others’ contributions in each round, and in another treatment subjects 
received no information about others’ contributions. Their results show that contributions only decline with 
information  but  remain  roughly  constant  in  the  absence  of  information.  This  finding  suggests  that  “virtual 
learning” plays little role in public goods environments.  
16 As with belief formation, we estimated all models with random and fixed effects specifications, as well as with 
Tobit. Since the estimation results are very similar, we only report the OLS results.    16
Model 3 only includes beliefs as an explanatory variable. We find strong evidence for 
conditional  cooperation:  beliefs  are  highly  significantly  positively  correlated  with 
contributions.
17  The explanatory power (in terms of R
2) is even higher than of the variable 
“Predicted contribution”.  
Model 4 combines all variables. We find that “Predicted contribution” and “Belief” matter 
highly significantly. In other words, in the C-experiments, there is conditional cooperation on 
top of contribution preferences, but there is no significant decline in cooperation that is not 
explained  by  “Predicted  contribution”  and  “Belief”.  In  Models  5a  to  5e  we  therefore 
concentrate on the impact of the variables “Predicted contribution” and “Belief”. The models 
differ in the time horizon considered and in whether “confused” subjects (according to the 
FGF classification) are included (Model 5a) or not (Models 5b to 5e).
18  
 
TABLE 2—EXPLAINING CONTRIBUTIONS 
  Dependent variable: Contribution 





Periods used  1-10  1-10  1-10  1-10  1-10  1-10  1  1-5  6-10 
Period  -0.639      -0.060           
  (0.071)***      (0.056)           
Predicted     0.469    0.242  0.242  0.443  0.393  0.385  0.614 
contribution    (0.069)***    (0.069)**  (0.069)**  (0.073)***  (0.089)***  (0.074)***  (0.082)*** 
Belief      0.792  0.644  0.666  0.545  0.708  0.582  0.376 
      (0.023)***  (0.071)***  (0.059)***  (0.065)***  (0.078)***  (0.065)***  (0.116)** 
Constant  8.343  2.953  -0.327  0.005  -0.473  -0.318  -1.077  -0.204  -0.116 
  (0.545)***  (0.144)***  (0.215)  (0.569)  (0.244)  (0.312)  (0.509)*  (0.541)  (0.378) 
Observations  1400  1400  1400  1400  1400  1260  126  630  630 
R-squared  0.10  0.16  0.30  0.34  0.34  0.38  0.50  0.33  0.33 
Robust standard errors in parentheses * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 
+ Models 5b to 5e exclude (confused) subjects who, on the basis of the P-experiment could not be classified 
according to the FGF classification as either a “free rider”, “conditional cooperator”, or a “triangle contributor”. 
 
                                                 
17 This observations confirms previous findings on the importance of beliefs for contributions (e.g., Weimann 
(1994); Croson (2007); Neugebauer, et al. (in print)).  
18 We think it is justified to exclude confused subjects because their predicted contribution is not only visually 
unclassifiable. It also does not predict their contribution. A regression according to model 5 restricted to these 
types yield a coefficient of -0.078 for their predicted contribution.    17
Why  do  subjects  condition  their  contribution  decision  not  only  on  their  preferences 
according  to  their  predicted  contribution  but  also  take  their  belief  into  account?  The  P-
experiment  and  the  C-experiment,  though  closely  related,  are  different  games.  The  P-
experiment  is  a  pure  one-shot  game  played  with  the  strategy  method,  whereas  the  C-
experiment is a sequence of ten one-shot games played in the direct response mode. Perhaps 
subjects see some value in keeping cooperation high, thus, cooperating for strategic reasons. 
Consistent  with  this  argument  we  find  that  all  types,  even  free  riders,  exhibit  a  positive 
correlation  between  beliefs  and  contributions  (see  Fischbacher  and  Gächter  (2006)  for 
details).  Strategic  cooperation  makes  only  sense  at  the  beginning.  This  means  that  the 
coefficient  for  the  predicted  contribution  should  be  higher  for  later  periods,  while  the 
coefficient for the belief should be lower. This is indeed the case, as regressions 5c to 5e 
show.  
In the previous section, we have seen that the belief formation process per se cannot 
account for the decline in cooperation. Thus, the decline must be due to subjects’ contribution 
behavior. Model 3 provides one answer. According to this model subjects contribute about 80 
percent of what they believe the others contribute (the constant is insignificantly different 
from zero). According to this model, subjects would therefore contribute about 0.792
10   9.7 
percent of the period 1 belief in period 10. When we consider Models 5a to 5e, the decline is 
not  directly  visible  in  these  regressions,  since  the  sum  of  the  coefficients  of  “Predicted 
contributions”  and  “Belief”  is  close  to  one.  However,  the  predicted  contribution  is  itself 
dependent  on  the  belief.  Moreover,  the  weight  subjects  put  on  average  on  “Predicted 
contributions” is about half of the weight subjects put on “Belief”. Therefore, the main source 
of the decline of cooperation is the fact that subjects are on average imperfect conditional 
cooperators, who undercut what they believe others will contribute.  
   18
E. Simulations 
In  this  section  we  use  simulation  methods  to  understand  the  role  of  preference 
heterogeneity,  and  belief  updating,  for  the  decline  of  cooperation.  We  study  variants  of 
subjects’  contribution  preferences  and  belief  update  processes  in  order  to  assess  which 
features of these processes are essential for the decline of cooperation in general, and how 
these features influence the speed of the decline.  
All  our  simulations  are  based  on  a  two-stage decision  process.  In  the  first  stage,  the 
simulated players form a belief about the other players’ contributions. Then, players decide on 
a contribution, which they (partially) base on their belief. Thus, our simulation models differ 
in  two  dimensions,  in  how  subjects  form  their  beliefs  and  in  how  they  determine  their 
contribution.  We  investigate  two  variants  of  belief  updating  processes:  “naïve  belief 
updating” and “weighted-average belief updating”. In the models with naïve belief updating, 
players believe that the other players contribute as much in the current period to the public 
good as they did in the previous period. In weighted-average belief updating people form 
beliefs as a weighted average of others’ contributions and own beliefs in period t–1. We use 
the estimated coefficients of Model 5 in Table 1 for parameterization. 
We use five different contribution models for simulating contributions.  
1.  In the P-model we assume that subjects choose their contribution according to their 
predicted contribution (P) only, that is, their preference schedule as elicited in the P-
experiment.  This  model  allows  us  to  gauge  the  importance  of  mere  preference 
interaction for the decay of cooperation.  
2.  In the PB-model the players determine their contribution according to their predicted 
contribution (P) as well as their beliefs (B). The weights correspond to the estimated 
parameters of Model 5a in Table 2. The comparison to the P-model sheds light on the 
importance of beliefs on top of preferences for the decay of cooperation.   19
3.  In  the iCC-model  we  assume  that  all  players  are  identical  conditional  cooperators 
(iCC).  That  is,  every  simulated  subject  contributes  according  to  the  average 
preference schedule in the P-experiment: Contribution =   + k*Contribution of others. 
The  estimates  from  the  data  of  our  P-experiment  return   =0.956  and  k=0.425. 
Therefore, in the iCC-model Contribution = 0.956 + 0.425*Contribution of others. 
According to this model, contributions converge to 1.66, that is, contributions above 
1.66  will  decline.  Since  the  iCC-model  eliminates  preference  heterogeneity,  the 
comparison to the P-model – where preference heterogeneity is present – informs us 
therefore  about  the  importance  of  preference  heterogeneity  for  the  decay  of 
cooperation.  
4.  In the iCCB-model we assume as well that players are homogenous with respect to 
their preferences (players’ conditional cooperation is based on the average preference 
schedule as in the iCC-model). However, people do not simply apply their preferences 
but  also  incorporate  their  beliefs  directly  like  in  the  PB-model.  Thus,  this  model 
informs us how for the representative player beliefs matter on top of preferences, or – 
in  comparison  with  the  PB  model  –  it  informs  us  about  the  role  of  preference 
heterogeneity of players when beliefs matter on top of preferences. 
5.  Finally,  in  the  pCC-model  we  assume  that  all  players  are  perfect  conditional 
cooperators,  that  is,  players  match  their  belief  exactly: Contribution(t)  =  Belief(t). 
According  to  this  model  contributions  only  decline  if  beliefs  decline.  This  model 
therefore allows testing how much the belief formation process per se contributes to 
the decline of cooperation.  
Since we have five basic models and two belief updating processes, we have ten models in 
total. In all models, we take the actual first-period contributions and beliefs as the starting 
values in our simulation and let contributions evolve as determined by either the schedules of 
our  participants  (in  the  P-model  and  the  PB-model)  or  as  determined  by  the  respective   20
decision rule of the representative agent in the iCC-model, iCCB-model and the pCC-model. 
For determining interactions we used the exact matching structure that was in place in the C-
experiments.  
Figure 3 depicts the simulation results. Panel A shows the results of our five basic models 
under  naïve  belief  formation  and  panel  B  under  weighted-average  belief  formation.  We 
compare the simulation results to the actual average contributions over all six sessions.  
First, the pCC-models predict the emergence of stable cooperation over time. The details 
of  belief  updating  do  not  matter  much  for  perfect  conditional  cooperators.  These  results 
confirm  that  the  belief  formation  process  per  se  does  not  contribute  to  the  decline  of 
cooperation. The comparisons to all other models show that under random matching the decay 
of cooperation can only be prevented if everyone is a perfect conditional cooperator.
19  

























































FIGURE 3. SIMULATION RESULTS.  
 
Second, for all other models Figure 3A shows that naïve belief updating predicts a far too 
quick decline in cooperation. Figure 3B demonstrates that weighted-average belief updating 
                                                 
19 Notice, however, that it is very unlikely that four perfect conditional cooperators are matched. Among our 
140 subjects we had 13 perfect conditional cooperators. The likelihood that four conditional cooperators are 
matched randomly is therefore less than 7.5E
-5.   21
does a much better job. In other words, the weight people put on their own belief in period t–1 
relative to the weight on others’ previous contributions matters significantly for the speed of 
the decay.  
Third, in terms of closeness to the actual average contribution pattern the best model is the 
PB-model  which  combines  predicted  contributions  and  beliefs  and  uses  weighted-average 
belief updating. The comparison to the P-model shows that under naïve and weighted-average 
belief updating, beliefs matter on top of preferences; pure preference interaction (the P-model) 
predicts a decline too quick compared to the actual data. As we have seen in the discussion of 
the regression in Table 2, beliefs could represent some strategic conditional cooperation that 
“slows down” the decay compared to the decay induced by preferences alone.  
Fourth,  we  can  assess  the  importance  of  preference  heterogeneity  in  two  ways,  by 
comparing the P-model with the iCC-model and by comparing the PB-model with the iCCB-
model.  By  construction,  the  iCC-model  and  the  iCCB-model  eliminate  preference 
heterogeneity  by  replacing  the  individual  preference  schedules  by  the  average  preference 
schedule, whereas the P-model and the PB-model use the individual preference schedules. 
Both  comparisons  show  that  preference  heterogeneity  is  surprisingly  unimportant  in 
explaining the decay of cooperation because the P-model and the iCC-model match each 
other closely; the same holds for the PB-model and the iCCB-model which are both much 
closer to the actual data, however. Heterogeneity matters only at the end of the experiment. In 
the simulations with the models with homogenous preferences contributions stop declining 
toward the end while the models with heterogeneous preferences correctly predict the decline 
also in the last periods. 
We conclude this section by evaluating the predictive power of our models statistically. 
Table 3 collects the results. First, we calculate the correlation between the actual and the 
predicted contribution. The PB-model with weighted-average belief updating has the highest 
correlation between actual and predicted cooperation (Pearson correlation equals 0.524, and   22
Spearman rank correlation equals 0.460). We also ran regressions with the model prediction 
as regressor. Ideally, the coefficient of the model should equal 1, the constant should equal 0, 
and the R
2 should be high. This is the case for the PB-model and the iCCB-model under 
weighted-average belief updating (indicated by a “yes”-entry in table 3).  
The second part in Table 3 reports the same statistics for the predicted beliefs. Since in all 
our models cooperation is based on beliefs, the models also predict beliefs. Therefore, we can 
apply the same econometric tests also to assess the quality of the predicted beliefs. It turns out 
that the PB-model with weighted-average belief updating is also the best model with respect 
to its predicted beliefs.  
 
TABLE 3—MODEL PERFORMANCE SORTED BY THE SPEARMAN CORRELATION BETWEEN 
PREDICTED AND ACTUAL CONTRIBUTION.  
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WAB  PB  0.460  0.524  yes  yes  0.28 0.648  0.690  yes  yes  0.48
WAB  P  0.444  0.369      0.14 0.571  0.643      0.41
WAB  iCC  0.410  0.474  yes    0.23 0.642  0.674  yes  yes  0.46
WAB  iCCB  0.396  0.500  yes  yes  0.25 0.631  0.678  yes  yes  0.46
NB  iCCB  0.378  0.446      0.20 0.595  0.613      0.38
NB  PB  0.361  0.445      0.20 0.577  0.611      0.37
NB  iCC  0.357  0.430      0.19 0.521  0.551      0.30
NB  P  0.356  0.330      0.11 0.366  0.475      0.23
WAB  pCC  0.231  0.378      0.14 0.331  0.491  yes    0.24
NB  pCC  0.155  0.304    yes  0.09 0.267  0.399    yes  0.16
Note: WAB denotes “weighted-average belief updating”; NB denotes “naïve belief updating.” “yes” indicates 
that a test fails to reject the null hypothesis that in the regressions slope=1 and constant=0, respectively. 
 
 
Our  simulation  results  suggest  that  the  type  composition  of  a  group  matters  for 
cooperation. Groups that consist of perfect conditional cooperators should be able to maintain 
very high cooperation levels, whereas groups that consist mostly of free rider types or weak   23
conditional  cooperator  types  should  exhibit  low  cooperation  rates.  These  predictions  are 
consistent  with  recent  evidence,  in  which  subjects  are  matched  according  to  their  past 
contributions as in Gächter and Thöni (2005), Burlando and Guala (2005) Gunnthorsdottir, et 
al. (2007) and Page, et al. (2005). These studies find higher contributions in the groups that 
were formed of subjects who contributed more in the past. Since in these high cooperator 
groups, cooperation was more stable than in mixed group, also average contribution of all 
groups was higher in treatments with segregated groups than in treatments with mixed groups.  
Our results can explain these findings as follows. The regrouping mechanisms ensure that 
players of similar cooperativeness are matched up (either at the beginning of the experiment 
or various times during the experiment). Because (i) players of the respective type observe 
others contributing at a particular level, beliefs that others will contribute at that level are 
sustained, and because (ii) beliefs only decay if contributions decay, contributions actually are 
largely stabilized at initial levels.  
Group  composition  effects  with  regard  to  level  and  decay  of  cooperation  can  occur 
without any assortative regroupings. Our simulation results predict this. First, the decay is 
slightly stronger if preferences are more heterogeneous (compare the iCC- and iCCB-models 
and  the  P-  and  PB-models).  Second,  recall  that  the  iCC-  and  iCCB-model  are  based  on 
Contribution = k*Contribution of others, where k is the average slope of the contribution 
schedules of group members. The more free riders are in a group, the lower will this slope be. 
Consequently (according to Model 5c in Table 2) the lower will initial contributions be and 
the decay will occur faster. 
The evidence is consistent with this prediction. Gunnthorsdottir, et al. (2007) observed 
that the cooperative decay is larger in groups with more free rider types. Similarly, Kurzban 
and Houser (2005) found that groups with more cooperator types exhibited higher cooperation 
levels  than  groups  with  more  free  rider  types.  Finally,  in  our  own  experiments,  the 
distribution of types is not significantly different across the six sessions ( 
2-test, p=0.510). It   24
is therefore no surprise that contribution patterns are very similar in our six sessions (see 
Figure 1).  
 
III. Summary and conclusions 
Our goal in this study was to provide a direct test of the role of social preferences and beliefs 
about  others’  contributions  in  voluntary  cooperation.  We  achieved  this  by  eliciting 
preferences in one specially-designed game (the “P-experiment”) and observing contributions 
and  beliefs  in ten one-shot standard  public goods  games  with  random  matching  (the  “C-
experiments”). We found that subjects’ contributions decline because on average subjects are 
only “imperfect conditional cooperators”: they match others’ contributions only partially, or, 
in case of free riders, not at all. We have shown that the belief formation process contributes 
only little – if anything at all – to the decline of cooperation. Thus, the decline of cooperation 
can only be prevented if average conditional cooperation is sufficiently high. Since there are 
almost no subjects who contribute more than the others, this means that stable cooperation 
can only emerge if all players are perfect conditional cooperators. 
Our results reinforce the theoretical prediction by recent models of social preferences that 
in  the  absence  of  punishment  opportunities,  voluntary  cooperation  will  end  in  almost 
universal free riding behavior.
20 This holds despite the fact that a majority of people is not 
motivated  by  selfishness.  We  think  this  result  is  important  in  view  of  arguments  that 
deviations from income-maximizing Nash-equilibria are largely due to inexperience and lack 
of  trial-and-error  learning.  Binmore  (2006)  makes  this  viewpoint  very  clear  in  a  recent 
comment on social preference explanations of experimental results:  
                                                 
20 Consistent with this prediction, Herrmann, et al. (2008) found in public goods experiments they ran in sixteen 
subject pools around the world that cooperation collapsed in all but one subject pools.    25
“… There is a huge literature which shows that adequately rewarded laboratory subjects learn to play 
income-maximizing Nash equilibria in a wide variety of games – provided they have gained sufficient 
experience of the game and the way that other subjects play”.   
After Binmore has cited the standard result of eventual free riding in repeated public 
goods experiments in support of the above argument he argues:  
“I emphasize the standard results in Public Goods games because the orthodox view among mainstream 
economists and game theorists (…) is not that the learning or trial-and-error adjustment that might take 
place during repeated play (against a new opponent each time) is a secondary phenomenon to which 
conclusions may or may not be sensitive. On the contrary, the fact that laboratory subjects commonly 
adapt  their  behavior  to  the  game  they  are  playing  as  they  gain  experience  is  entirely  central  to  our 
position.” 
Our  results  from  the  P-experiment  and  the  C-experiment,  which  separate  preferences, 
beliefs and behavior, uncover how experience in the public goods game matters. First, beliefs 
only decline if contributions decline; “virtual learning” (thinking about the dominant strategy 
in this case) is unimportant. Second, contributions are determined significantly by people’s 
contribution  preferences  and  beliefs.  This  is  also  true  for  the  initial  contributions,  where 
people have not yet made any experience. If people were confused and did not know what to 
do, such a correlation would be unlikely. Third, the preference-type composition of groups 
determines the contribution level and the contribution path systematically. In groups with 
more free rider types the decay happens faster than in groups with fewer free riders. In groups 
that consist of cooperators only, contributions are stabilized at high levels. These are very 
unlikely  outcomes  if  contributions  were  solely  due  to  trial-and-error  learning.  Fourth, 
contributions  decline  (in  randomly  composed  groups)  because  the  majority  of  people  are 
imperfect  conditional  cooperators  and  because  the  conditional  cooperators  have  no 
punishment opportunity other than withdrawing their own contribution if they are duped by 
free riders. Thus, after some time all types behave like income-maximizing free riders, even 
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Appendix: Instructions for the experiment 
This is a translation of the original German version. We present the instructions of the P-C experiments here; 
those of the C-P experiments were adapted accordingly. They are available upon request. 
 
Instructions for the P-Experiment 
You are now taking part in an economics experiment financed by the Swiss Science Foundation. If you read the 
following instructions carefully, you can – depending on your decisions – earn some more money in addition to 
the 10 Francs, which you can keep in any case. The entire amount of money which you earned with your 
decisions will be added up and paid to you in cash at the end of the experiment. These instructions are solely for 
your private information. You are not allowed to communicate  during the experiment. If you have any 
questions, please ask us. Violation of this rule will lead to the exclusion from the experiment and all payments. If 
you have questions, please raise your hand. A member of the experimenter team will come to you and answer 
them in private. 
We will not speak of Francs during the experiment, but rather of points. Your whole income will first be 
calculated in points. At the end of the experiment, the total amount of points you earned will be converted to 
Francs at the following rate: 
1 point = 35 centimes. 
All participants will be divided in groups of four members. Except for us - the experimenters - no one knows 
who is in which group. 
We describe the exact experiment process below.  
The decision situation 
You will learn how the experiment will be conducted later. We first introduce you to the basic decision situation. 
You will find control questions at the end of the description of the decision situation that help you to understand 
the decision situation. 
You will be a member of a group consisting of 4 people. Each group member has to decide on the allocation of 
20 points. You can put these 20 points into your private account or you can invest them fully or partially into a 
project. Each point you do not invest into the project, will automatically remain in your private account. 
 
Your income from the private account: 
You will earn one point for each point you put into your private account. For example, if you put 20 points 
into your private account (and therefore do not invest into the project) your income will amount to exactly 20 
points out of your private account. If you put 6 points into your private account, your income from this account 
will be 6 points. No one except you earns something from your private account. 
Your income from the project 
Each group member will profit equally from the amount you invest into the project. On the other hand, you 
will also get a payoff from the other group members' investments. The income for each group member will be 
determined as follows: 
 
Income from the project = sum of all contributions × 0.4 
 
If, for example, the sum of all contributions to the project is 60 points, then you and the other members of your 
group each earn 60 × 0.4 = 24 points out of the project. If four members of the group contribute a total of 10 
points to the project, you and the other members of your group each earn 10 × 0.4 = 4 points. 
Total income: 
Your total income is the sum of your income from your private account and that from the project: 
Income from your private account (= 20 – contribution to the project) 
+ Income from the project (= 0.4   sum of all contributions to the project) 
Total income 
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Control questions: 
Please answer the following control questions. They will help you to gain an understanding of the calculation of 
your income, which varies with your decision about how you distribute your 20 points. Please answer all the 
questions and write down your calculations. 
1.  Each group member has 20 points. Assume that none of the four group members (including you) contributes 
anything to the project. 
  What will your total income be?  ___________ 
  What will the total income of the other group members be?  ___________ 
2.  Each group member has 20 points. You invest 20 points in the project. Each of the other three members of 
the group also contributes 20 points to the project. 
  What will your total income be?  ___________ 
  What will the total income of the other group members be?  ___________ 
3. Each group member has 20 points. The other 3 members contribute a total of 30 points to the project. 
  a)  What will your total income be, if you – in addition to the 30 points – invest 0 points into the project? 
   Your Income  ___________ 
  b)  What will your total income be, if you – in addition to the 30 points – invest 8 points into the project? 
   Your Income    ___________ 
  c)  What will your total income be, if you – in addition to the 30 points – invest 15 points into the project? 
   Your Income    ___________ 
4.   Each group member has 20 points at his or her disposal. Assume that you invest 8 points to the project. 
  a)  What is your total income if the other group members – in addition to your 8 points – contribute another 
7 points to the project? 
   Your Income  ___________ 
  b)  What is your total income if the other group members – in addition to your 8 points – contribute another 
12 points to the project? 
   Your Income  ___________ 
  c)  What is your income if the other group members – in addition to your 8 points – contribute another 22 
points to the project? 
   Your Income  ___________ 
 
The Experiment 
The  experiment  includes  the  decision  situation  just  described  to  you.  You  will  be  paid  at  the  end  of  the 
experiment based on the decisions you make in this experiment. The experiment will only be conducted once. As 
you know, you will have 20 points at your disposal. You can put them into a private account or you can invest 
them into a project. Each subject has to make two types of decisions in this experiment, which we will refer to 
below as the “unconditional contribution” and “contribution table”. 
   You decide how many of the 20 points you want to invest into the project in the unconditional contribution. 
Please indicate your contribution in the following computer screen: 
 
 
After you have determined your unconditional contribution, please click “OK”. 
Help 
Please enter your unconditional contribution to the 
project. Press "OK" when you are done. 
Your unconditional contribution  
to the project 
1 of 1  Remaining time [sec]  Period   30
   Your second task is to fill in a “contribution table” where you indicate how many tokens you want to 
contribute to the project for each possible average contribution of the other group members (rounded 
to the next integer). You can condition your contribution on that of the other group members. This will be 




The numbers are the possible (rounded) average contributions of the other group members to the project. You 
simply have to insert how many tokens you will contribute to the project into each input box – conditional on the 
indicated average contribution. You have to make an entry into each input box. For example, you will have to 
indicate how much you contribute to the project if the others contribute 0 tokens to the project, how much you 
contribute if the others contribute 1, 2, or 3 tokens, etc. You can insert any integer numbers from 0 to 20 in 
each input box. Once you have made an entry in each input box, click “OK”. 
After  all  participants  of  the  experiment  have  made  an  unconditional  contribution  and  have  filled  in  their 
contribution table, a random mechanism will select a group member from every group. Only the contribution 
table will be the payoff-relevant decision for the randomly determined subject. Only the unconditional 
contribution will be the payoff-relevant decision for the other  three  group  members not selected by the 
random mechanism. You obviously do not know whether the random mechanism will select you when you make 
your unconditional contribution and when you fill in the contribution table. You will therefore have to think 
carefully about both types of decisions because both can become relevant for you. Two examples should make 
this clear. 
EXAMPLE 1: Assume that the random mechanism selects you. This implies that your relevant decision 
will be your contribution table. The unconditional contribution is the relevant decision for the other three 
group members. Assume they made unconditional contributions of 0, 2, and 4 tokens. The average contribution 
of these three group members, therefore, is 2 tokens. If you indicated in your contribution table that you will 
contribute 1 token if the others contribute 2 tokens on average, then the total contribution to the project is given 
by  0+2+4+1=7  tokens.  All  group  members,  therefore,  earn  0.4×7=2.8  points  from  the  project  plus  their 
respective income from the private account. If, instead, you indicated in your contribution table that you would 
contribute 19 tokens if the others contribute two tokens on average, then the total contribution of the group to the 
project is given by 0+2+4+19=25. All group members therefore earn 0.4×25=10 points from the project plus 
their respective income from the private account. 
EXAMPLE 2: Assume that the random mechanism did not select you, implying that the unconditional 
contribution is taken as the payoff-relevant decision for you and two other group members. Assume your 
unconditional contribution is 16 tokens and those of the other two group members are 18 and 20 tokens. Your 
average unconditional contribution and that of the two other group members, therefore, is 18 tokens. If the group 
member whom the random mechanism selected indicates in her contribution table that she will contribute 1 
token if the other three group members contribute on average 18 tokens, then the total contribution of the group 
to the project is given by 16+18+20+1=55 tokens. All group members will therefore earn 0.4×55=22 points from 
the  project  plus  their  respective  income  from  the  private  account.  If,  instead,  the  randomly  selected  group 
member indicates in her contribution table that she contributes 19 if the others contribute on average 18 tokens, 
Help: Enter the amount which you want to contribute to the project if the others make 
the average contribution which stands to the left of the entry field. When you have 
completed your entries, press "OK". 
1 of 1 
Your conditional contribution to the project 
Remaining time [sec]  Period   31
then the total contribution of that group to the project is 16+18+20+19=73 tokens. All group members will 
therefore earn 0.4×73=29.2 points from the project plus their respective income from the private account. 
 
The random selection of the participants will be implemented as follows. Each group member is assigned a 
number between 1 and 4. As you remember, a participant, namely the one with the number 11, was randomly 
selected at the very beginning of the experiment. This participant will throw a 4-sided die after all participants 
have made their unconditional contribution and have filled out their contribution table. The resulting number will 
be entered into the computer. If participant 11 throws the membership number that was assigned to you, then 
your contribution table will be relevant for you and the unconditional contribution will be the payoff-relevant 




Instructions for the C-Experiment 
 
We will now conduct another experiment. This experiment lasts 10 periods, in which you and the other group 
members have to make decisions. As in the other experiment, every group consists of 4 people. The formation of 
the group changes at random after every period. So your group consists of different people in all 10 periods. 
The whole experiment is finished after these 10 periods,. 
 
The decision situation is the same as that described on page 2 of the instructions of the previous experiment. 
Each member of the group has to decide about the usage of the 20 points. You can put these 20 points into your 
private account or you can invest them fully or partially into a project. Each point you do not invest into the 
project is automatically placed into your private account. Your income will be determined in the same way as 
before. Reminder: 
 
     
  Income from your private account (= 20 – contribution to the project)  
  + Income from the project (= 0.4   sum of all contributions to the project)   
  Total income   
  1 point = 7 centimes!   
 
The decision screen, which you will see in every period, looks like this: 
 
As you can see, you have to make two inputs: 
 
1.  First you have to decide on your contribution to the project, that is, you have to decide how many of the 
20 points you want to contribute to the project, and how many points you want to put into your private 
account. This decision is the same as the unconditional contribution of the previous experiment. You only 
make unconditional decisions in this experiment. There is no contribution table. 
 
Help 
Press "OK" when you have completed your entries 
What is your estimate of the average contribution from the OTHER group 
members in this period (rounded to an integer? 
Your contribution to the project 
Your endowment 
Remaining time [sec]  1 of 10  Period   32
2.  Afterwards you have to estimate the average contribution to the project (rounded to an integer) of the other 
three group members of this period. You will be paid for the accuracy of your estimate: 
 
   If your estimate is exactly right (that is, if your estimate is exactly the same as the actual average 
contribution of the other group members), you will get 3 points in addition to your other income from 
the experiment. 
   If your estimate deviates by one point from the correct result, you will get 2 additional points. 
   A deviation by 2 points still earns you 1 additional point. 
   If your estimate deviates by 3 or more points from the correct result, you will not get any additional 
points. 
 
After these 10 periods are over, the whole experiment is finished and you will receive: 
 
  +  your income from the first experiment 
  +  your income from the second experiment (including your income from your correct estimates) 
  =  total income from both experiments 
 
  + 10 Francs show up fee ! 
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